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THE THIRTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING 
The thirty-ninth annual meeting of the South Carolina Historical As-
sociation was held Saturday, March 29, 1969, at Anderson College, Ander-
son, South Carolina. About 80 members and guests attended one or more 
of the programs. 
Following registration and a coffee hour in Watkins Teaching Center, 
the morning session was held in Room 100 of the Center. Dr. J. E. Rouse, 
President, welcomed the members to Anderson College. Jerome V. Reel, 
Jr., of Clemson University read a paper on "The English Parliament and the 
Theory of Corporation," which was discussed by James Campbell, Visiting 
Professor at the University of South Carolina, and William F. Ricketson, 
Jr., of Lander College read a paper on "Puritan Myths in the Background of 
American Foreign Policy," which was discussed by Kenneth Clements, 
University of South Carolina. 
Luncheon was served in the private dining room on the ground floor 
of the main building. Following the luncheon, the annual business meeting 
was held. The minutes of the last meeting were approved as printed in the 
Proceedings and the Treasurer's report, which was distributed at the lunch-
eon, was adopted. 
Dr. Lesesne, for the Executive Committee, presented the following 
slate of officers for 1969/70: 
President: Lowry P. Ware, Erskine College 
Vice-President: Henry von Hasseln, Anderson College 
Secretary-Treasurer: Richard M. Gannaway, Converse College 
Executive Committee member ( term to expire 1972): Wylma Wates, 
South Carolina Archives Department 
Nominations from the floor were called for but there were none and the re-
port was accepted. 
It was announced that the Executive Committee had accepted the in-
vitation of The Citadel to hold the next annual meeting of the Association 
in Charleston on April 24 and 25, 1970, in connection with the Tricentennial 
celebration. All papers will deal with South Carolina history. 
Dr. Rogers announced that Dr. Daniel Hollis had resigned from the 
Tri-Centennial Commission and that the Executive Committee had agreed 
that he should recommend Dr. J. M. Lesesne, Jr., to fill the vacancy. He 
did so and Governor McNair made the appointment. Dr. Lesesne then 
made a short report on the activities of the Commission. 
At the request of the President, Dr. Bradley D. Bargar announced that 
there would be a scholarly symposium at the University of South Carolina, 
in connection with the Tricentennial celebration on March 19, 20, and 21, 
1970, that distinguished contributors had already been scheduled, and that 
its topic would be ''The Place of the Southern Colonies in the Atlantic 
World." 
Dr. Robert K. Ackerman, chairman of the Tricentennial sub-committee 
on publications, reported on the plans and progress of his committee. 
Dr. Rogers thanked Dr. Mullins for the work he had done as Editor of 
the Proceedings and announced that the Executive Committee had ap-
pointed Lowry P. Ware as the new Editor. Dr. Rogers thanked Dr. Tucker 
for the work he had done as Secretary-Treasurer of the Association, Dr. 
Ware for the program he had arranged for the present meeting, and Mr. 
von Hasseln for making the local arrangements for the meeting. 
The business session adjourned at 2:20 p. m. 
The aftemon session consisted of two papers. J. M. Thom, College of 
Charleston, read a paper on "Socialized Medicine - Some Aspects of the 
British Experience," which was discussed by Joseph Wightman, Erskine 
College, and Edward H. Beardsley, University of South Carolina, read a 
paper on "Dollars From Scholars: The Wisconsin Alumni Research Founda-
tion," which was discussed by William E. Leverette, Jr., Furman University. 
From 4:30 to 5:30 p. m., the members were guests at a reception in 
the home of President and Mrs. Rouse. 
The banquet was held in the private dining room on the ground floor 
of the main building. Following the banquet, Dr. John Scott Wilson, Uni-
versity of South Carolina, read a paper on "The New Left Historians," after 
which the meeting was adjourned. 
THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT 
AND THE THEORY OF CORPORATION 
JEROME V. REEL, JR. 
Marc Bloch, in his work, Feudal Society, concluded that it was "as-
suredly no accident that the representative system, in the very aristocratic 
form of the English Parliament, the French 'Estates,' the Stande of Ger-
many, and the Spanish Cortes, originated in states which were only just 
emerging from the feudal stage and still bore its imprint."1 In the same 
work he commented on the role of the representative system in creating or 
binding together a unified England. "Observe,'' he wrote, "the contrasts 
between France and England. . . . In England there was Parliament; in 
France, the provincial Estates, always much more frequently convoked and 
on the whole more active than the States-General."2 These two statements 
suggest most of the historiographical problems of the medieval representa-
tive assemblies and, in particular, of the medieval English parliament. 
In studying representative assemblies, some historians have noted the 
similarity of the conception or reception of proctorship, which occurred in 
the assemblies in Europe at roughly the same time. It is, therefore, tempt-
ing for the instructor in civilization courses and even for the instructor in 
medieval history to toss all the assemblies together and to discuss them at 
once, leaving the student with the sensation that they are all alike. Upon 
closer observation, however, the assemblies do not appear to be so similar. 
Major differences are to be found in the business conducted and in the in-
dividuals or groups summoned.8 
Basically, parliamentary historians have been faced with three signifi-
cant problems: first, the origin of parliament, second, the business done 
only by the institution, and third, the persons or groups summoned to the 
assembly. The first of the problems has proved to be the most frustrating 
for, in so many ways, it depends upon successful understanding of the lat-
ter two problems. Nevertheless, a number of historians have attempted to 
deal with the origin of parliamentary institutions. A recent essay by 
George P. Cuttino, "Medieval Parliament Reinterpreted,''4 is basically an 
updating of the bibliographical studies of Robert S. Hoyt5 and Geoffrey 
1Marc Bloch, Feudal Society, Chicago, Illinois, 1961, p. 452. 
2Jbid., pp. 425-426. 
3William Stubbs, Constitutional HistOTy of England, Oxford, 1880, II, pp. 193-197. 
4 George P. Cuttino, "Medieval Parliament Reinterpreted," Speculum, XLI, 1966, 
pp. 681-687. 
5Robert S. Hoyt, "Recent Publications in the United States and Canada on the 
History of Representative Institutions Before the French Revolution," Speculum, XXIX, 
1954, pp. 358-366. 
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Templeman.6 Even the well-known "Heath series" has attempted to answer 
the question with the 1968 publication of Early English Parliaments.7 
The business of parliament is the second problem. In various studies, 
historians have made a distinction between that business done only by par-
liament and that done during parliament but common to other institutions. 
Bishop William Stubbs conceived that the English parliamentary institu-
tion was summoned to assent to taxes above the customary aids and fixed 
farms. Although Stubbs's thesis passed out of favor for nearly a half cen-
tury, it has been revived and somewhat modified by Robert S. Hoyt,8 
Carl Stephenson,9 J. F. Willard,10 and J. R. Strayer.11 They have suggested 
that the English parliament was an assembly convoked primarily to grant 
a special aid. To this assembly of magnates the king summoned represen-
tatives of the shires, of the boroughs in the ancient demesne, and of cities 
to ensure that any aid granted was approved by those who would collect 
and contribute. Frederic William Maitland, in his edition of the Memo-
randa of 1305, inadvertantly offered a second thesis, namely, that parlia-
ment was a high court of justice.12 Following this idea C. H. Mcilwain, in 
the early years of the twentieth century, 13 and, more recently, George L. 
Haskins, 14 have expanded and modified the thesis that the essential func-
tion of parliament was to provide the means for obtaining justice. Other 
6Geoffrey Templeman, "The History of Parliament to 1400 in the Light of Modem 
Research," University of Birmingham Historical Journal, I, 1948, pp. 202-231. 
7Gerald P. Bodet, editor and introducer, Early English Parliaments: High Courts, 
Royal Councils or Representative Assemblies, Boston, 1968. 
8Robert S. Hoyt, "Royal Taxation and the Growth of the Realm in Medieval Eng-
land," Speculum, XXV, 1950, pp. 36-48. 
9Carl Stephenson, "The Beginnings of Representative Government in England," 
in Conyers Read, editor, The Constitution Reconsidered, Washington, 1938, pp. 25-36. 
lOJ. F. Willard, Parliamentary Taxes on Personal Property, 1290-1334: A Study in 
Medieval English Financial Administration, Cambridge, 1934. 
11 Joseph R. Strayer, "Introduction," in W. A. Morris and Joseph R. Strayer, editors, 
The English Government at Work, 1327-1336, Cambridge, Mass., 1947, pp. 12-36. 
12Frederic W. Maitland, editor, The Records of Parliament holden at W estminster 
... in the thirty-first year of the reign of King Edward the First, London, 1893, p . 63. 
He indicated in the introduction that the fourteenth century parliament was a sophis-
ticated body dealing with the affairs of state, legislation, taxation, petitions, and justice. 
That Maitland's desire was to investigate a phase of parliament and not the essence was 
certainly the opinion of Sir Maurice Powicke. See G. P. Cuttino, "A Reconsideration of 
the Modus tenendi parliamentum," in F . L. Utley, editor, The Forward Movement of the 
Fourteenth Century, Columbus Ohio, 1961, p. 56, n. 11. 
13C. H. Mcilwain, The High Court of Parliament and Its Supremacy, New Haven, 
1910. 
14G. L. Haskins, "The Kings High Court of Parliament," History, 1940, XXIV, pp. 
295-310. There is some modification of his original view in The Growth of English Rep-
resentative Government, New York, 1960. 
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historians have suggested that parliament was a court of high inquest, 111 or 
that parliamentary business was essentially that of royal propaganda.16 
The third problem, namely, the summoning to parliament, has attracted 
the least attention until recently. In summoning an assembly, the king chose 
to convoke some of his subjects and to ignore others. Unless one wishes to 
suggest that the medieval assemblies sprang forth full blown it must be ad-
mitted that from the time of the calling of the town assemblies at Roncaglia 
in 1158 to the summoning of the assemblies in Aragon, England, France, 
and Leon and Castile at the beginning of the fourteenth century, various 
combinations were attempted by the kings. After the beginning of the 
fourteenth century, however, in most parliamentary and corporate institu-
tions the various groups summoned were fixed. Henceforth the changes in 
composition would be those of attrition and not of expansion. 
By 1952 two be.sic theories had been suggested concerning the sum-
moning to parliament. The first, known as "parliamentarianism," credited 
the king with the creation of an assembly of three estates to "give to all 
alike their direct share and interest in the common weal."17 The three 
estates corresponded to the three traditional estates of medieval society, 
that is, those who fought, those who prayed, and those who labored. Hav-
ing been summoned by the king the estates were to perform, as A. B. White 
stated, "self-government at the king's command." The second thesis, ad-
vanced by a number of continental scholars, has been proposed as a way of 
viewing all the assemblies of the late middle ages. Called "corporativism," 
this conception has had no better nor greater proponent that Emile Lousse 
of Louvain University. In the mid-1930's Professor Lousse proposed that 
corporativism was a combination of politically able groups forming a gov-
ernment on the basis of expediency. It spanned in time from the waning of 
the feudal kingdoms in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries to the emerg-
ence of the absolutist monarchies of the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies.18 Because his theory is so unusual it bears careful consideration. 
During the long break-up of the Carolinian empire, the concept of 
unity in government based upon abstract sovereignty was supplanted by a 
territorial hierarchy composed of lords of the vast conglomeration of pays, 
seigniories, and principalities, which, although practically independent, 
15Ludwig Riess, The History of the English Elect01'al Law in the Middle Ages, 
translated with additional notes by K. L. Woodlegh, Cambridge, 1940. 
1 6D. Pasquet, An essay on the origins of the House of Commons, translated by 
R. G. D. Laffan, Cambridge, 1925. 
17Jbid., p. v. 
lSEmile Lousse, "Parlementarisme ou Corporatisme? Les Origines des Assemblees 
d'Etats," Reooe Hi~orique de Droit Francois es Etranger, IVth Series, XIV, 1935, pp. 
683-706. 
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owed certain forms of social and political allegiance to the king. To gain 
the support of such a conglomeration the king needed to secure the aid of 
the hierarchy. This he summoned to meet with him, not singly, not individ-
ually, but as a corporation, a group. By the very fact that it was regularly 
consulted as a group, the hierarchy limited the king by becoming an organic 
corporation of the medieval kingdom - der Territorialstaat. Occasionally 
the territorial hierarchy subdivided into separate kingdoms, a fate that be-
fell the Middle Kingdom. Yet, in the end, the kings survived, for kings, in-
asmuch as they held land and within their demesne controlled administra-
tion, were an integral part of the Territorialstaat. 
The kings found need of men who were not landed to serve them as 
functionaries, because the descendants of the Carolingian officials were, or 
soon became, lay magnates within the Territorialstaat itself. This holding 
of land had conferred a quality of independence upon the magnate, which 
was not desirable in a functionary. In the new governments of the tenth and 
eleventh centuries, this new personnel was rarely drawn from the laity. 
Rather, kings preferred to use clerks and, occasionally, prelates. Within 
time this group gained a vested interest in government and tended, because 
of its religious basis, to respond to the king in a unified manner. Drawn to-
gether, it was summoned by the king to meet with the first group, and it 
formed the second corporation - der Beamtentum. 
By the eleventh century a third force began to emerge within the realm. 
Owing to the reawakening of towns and commerce and to the increasing 
complexity of commercial enterprises, those who were so engaged, namely, 
producers, bankers, and merchants, formed professional and regional associ-
ations.19 Other individuals and other groups, whether free laborers, knights, 
or teachers, also began to form associations. All of these groups comprised 
an urban hierarchy of social, economic, judicial, and political interests, 
which the king was forced to consult for the successful operation of govern-
ment. Because they were summoned to meet with the first two corporations, 
they quickly took on similar attributes and became the third corporation -
der Standestaat. 
The three corporations, the territorial princes, the entrenched bureauc-
racy, and the bourgeois commercial estate, comprised the assembly. Of 
course, not all members of each corporation came in person. In fact, most 
sent proctors and were bound by the decisions of their proctors, a point of 
19This idea was not new to the eleventh century. In the sixteenth clause of Capi-
tularia Haristallense, "De sacramentis per gildonia invicem conjurantibus ut nemo facere 
praesumat," edited by Alfred Boretius, Haile on the Saale, 1883, I, p. 51. 
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Roman law that has been examined minutely by Gaines Post. 20 The kings 
should have been able to dominate the three corporations; but, in some 
cases the privileges and prerogatives of the individual corporations - or the 
three corporations together - had been increased by a king or his predeces-
sors in exchange for some immediate and needed aid. Consequently, the as-
semblies summoned were somewhat regular and permanent representations 
of the corporations, not under the king but in fact of him. Ultimately, they 
shared sovereign power with him. 21 
In spite of the sweeping aspects of his proposal, Professor Lousse has 
been ignored for the most part by historians of the English parliament. 
Helen Maud Cam alone has attempted to answer him. 22 She has rejected 
his thesis wholly, contending that the only form of corporate representation 
was the knight for his shire and the burgess for his borough, corporations 
based not upon class but upon land, and thus more elastic and durable. On 
the question of the composition or summoning of parliament, she has re-
turned to the original premise of Stubbs and Mcilwain: that a full parlia-
ment included the three estates. 
Recently younger parliamentary historians have begun to move away 
from the generalizations concerning the late middle ages and, in particular, 
concerning parliament. Today, the English parliament is being viewed 
within the context of its times. The older questions of essence and business 
do not loom so large and forbidding. Rather, historians are becoming con-
cerned with particular parliaments. As a result, two modem trends have 
been established: the study of parliament in its context through investiga-
tion of the documents and the study of its membership. 
The efforts to understand each English parliament of the late middle 
ages within its times is vexed by Modus tenendi parliamentum. The author 
of this document claims to describe the nature of parliament in the reign of 
Edward the Confessor. 23 Surviving in forty-eight manuscripts, twenty-five 
of which date from the fifteenth century, Modus has been the center of a 
20Gaines Post, Studies in Medieval Legal Thought: Public Law and the State, 1100-
1322, Princeton, 1964, pp. 61-162. Also see J. G. Edwards, "The 'Plena Potestas' of Eng-
lish Parliamentary Representatives," Oxford Essays in Medieval History Presented to H. 
E. Salter, Oxford, 1934. 
21Also see C. Hirschauer, Les etats d'Artois de lours origines a !'occupation fran-
caise, 1340-1630, Paris, 1923; and E. Lousse, Hetonstaan van de middeleeuwsche 
Standencolleges, Tilbourg, 1935. 
22Helen Cam, "The Theory and Practice of Representation in Medieval England," 
Lawfinders and Lawmakers in Medieval England, New York, 1963, pp. 159-175. Origi-
nally read at the Anglo-American Conference of Historians, July 11, 1952, and published 
in History XXXVII, 1953, pp. 11-26. 
23This has been considered to be a reference to the cult of St. Edward, king and 
Confessor, which flourished in the reigns of Edward II and Richard II. 
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controversy only now being resolved. 24 Stubbs and his followers have dis-
missed it as worthless.25 Until recently, even those historians who have 
considered it of some worth have assigned its origin to the late fourteenth 
or the middle of the fifteenth century, the latter being the date of the oldest 
existing manuscript. 26 
In the early 1930's, Maude V. Clarke demonstrated that Modus must 
date from the reign of Edward II. 27 Her argument was based upon the role 
of the lower clergy, the formation of the committee, and the other docu-
ments with which extant copies of the Modus tenendi parliamentum are 
found. She placed the composition of the document in 1322. In an unre-
lated investigation completed simultaneously with Clarke's, W. A. Morris 
concluded by offering 1321 as the most likely year of composition. 28 Since 
then a number of historians have concurred with Clarke and Morris not only 
in suggesting the early date for authorship, but also in concluding that the 
tract described, for the most part, actual parliamentary practices.29 
With respect to summoning, Modus tenendi parliamentum contains 
numerous specific instruction. "The summoning of parliament ought to pre-
24There have been several studies of the manuscript copies of Modus tenendi parlia-
mentum. Among the more significant are Charles Bemont, "La Date de la Composition 
du Modus tenendi parliamentum in Anglia, "Melanges Julien Havet, Paris, 1895, pp. 465-
485; Hodnett and White, "Manuscripts of the Modus tenendi parliamentum," English 
Historical Review, XXXIV, 1919, pp. 209-215; Maude V. Clarke, Medieval Representa-
tion and Consent: A Study in EaTly Parliaments in England and Ireland, with special 
Reference to the Modus tenendi parliamentum, London, 1936; and John Taylor, "The 
Manuscripts of Modus tenendi parliamentum," English Historical Review, LXXXIII, 
1968, pp. 673-688. 
25Stubbs, op. cit., p. 266, and Select Charters and Other Illustrations at English 
Constitutional History, Oxford, 1921, p. 500; G. T. Lapsley, "Knights of the Shire in the 
Parliaments of Edward II," English Historical Review, XXXIV, 1919, pp. 25-42, 152-171, 
and "The Interpretation of the Statute of York," English Historical Review, LVI, 1941, 
pp. 22-49, 411-446. It was dismissed by James Tait and D. Pasquet, also. A. F. Pollard 
accepted it but not without serious exception. See The Evolution at Parliament, New 
York, 1964, pp. 432-433. His suggestion that the document was of Lancastrian origin 
was followed by T. F. Tout, Chapters in Medieval Adminstrative History, Manchester, 
III, p. 138 n. 2. 
26William Richardson and G. 0. Sayles, The Irish Parliament in the Middle Ages, 
Philadelphia, 1952, p. 137; J. H. Round, The Commune of London, Westminster, 1899, 
p. 302 ff.; J. E. A. Jolliffee, The Constitutional History of Medieval England, London, 
1961, pp. 434-435. He suggested that it dated from the reign of Edward I, but that it 
did not represent an historical point of view. (p. 348) Later, be misread the role of the 
knights, citizens, and burgesses, in Modus suggesting that no parliament could be held 
without them. (p. 370); Faith Thompson, A Short History of Parliament, 1295-1642, 
Minneapolis, 1953, pp. 115-116. 
27Clarke, op. cit. 
2sw. A. Morris, "The Date of the Modus Tenendi Parliamentum," English Histori-
cal Review, XLIX, 1934, pp. 407-422. 
29Bertie Wilkinson, Constitutional History of England, London, 1958, II, p. 106 n. 
45; Vivian Galbraith, "The Modus tenendi parliamentum," Journal of the Warburg and 
Courtauld Institutes, 1957, p. 92; Taylor, op. cit., p. 687. 
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cede the first day of parliament by forty days."30 In practice, the year 1298 
was the last time until 1340 when a parliament composed of magnates, pre-
lates, proctors, knights, citizens, and burgesses was summoned with less than 
a forty day notice.31 Generally the king allowed about forty-five days al-
though, in the summoning of the Lincoln-Hilary parliament of 1316, a 
period of 103 days intervened. 
Of greater consequence was the grouping that the author of Modus 
tenendi parliamentum established among the summoned. "The king is the 
head, the beginning and the end of parliament, and thus he has no peer in 
his grade, and thus out of the king alone is the first grade. The second grade 
is composed of the archbishops, bishops, abbots, priors, holding by barony. 
The third grade is composed of the proctors of the clergy. The fourth grade 
is composed of the earls, barons and other magnates and nobles holding to 
the value of an earldom and barony, as it has been said before under the 
title concerning laity. The fifth grade is composed of knights of the shires. 
The sixth grade of citizens and burgesses: and thus parliament is composed 
of six grades."32 The author of Modus envisioned not three estates, nor even 
three corporations, but six grades. 
The studies of parliamentary membership are based upon the concep-
tion of parliament as the mirror of the political interests of England.33 For 
years, antiquarian and historical societies have collected notices of the lives 
of the members of parliaments, particularly of the knights of the shires. 
While these have been of delight to genealogists, historians have only begun 
to appreciate their possibilities. Combining such notices with the less ac-
cessible materials in the Calendars, the private repositories, and the public 
archives, historians have now begun to create compilations of short bi-
ographies. The pioneer in this approach has been J. S. Roskell.34 He has 
analyzed the membership of the commons for the parliament of 1422 and 
the speakers of the commoners from 1376 until 1521. From the biographies, 
Roskell has drawn profiles of commoners, and, by inference, has described 
30The quotations from Modus tenendi parliamentum are from the G. P. Cuttino 
translation of Maude Clarke's collation as found in his "Reconsideration," Chapter II. 
31Students of English history will recognize the forty day notice as a stipulation 
from Magna Carta, 1215. The Westminster parliament of 1340 and the Westminster 
parliament of 1341 are the only occurences from 1298 until 1495 when a period of less 
than forty days intervened. For a complete list of such see Maurice Powicke and E. B. 
Fryde, Handbook of British Chronology, London, 1961, pp. 499-544. 
32Modus tenendi parliamentum, Chapter XXIV. 
33Louis Namier, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III, London, 
1961. Such is the thesis of his famous work. See as well Josiah Wedgwood, History of 
Parliament, Register of the Ministers and of Members of both Houses, 1439-1509, Lon-
don, 1938. 
84J. S. Roskell, The Commons and Their Speakers in English Parliaments, 1376-
1523, Manchester, 1965, and The Commons in the Parliament of 1422, Manchester, 1954. 
S.C. STATE LIBRARY 
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the political roles they played. Since then, other studies have appeared, 
mostly in the form of unpublished dissertations. In these, however, the 
knights, burgesses, and citizens have been from a single county for the 
period of 1377 to 1422, for the most part.35 While the studies have demon-
strated that, by the end of the fourteenth century, the knights were men of 
stature and political prestige, who were undergoing stresses due to social 
conditions, neverthless they have not placed the membership within the con-
text of parliament and society.36 Furthermore, these studies have generally 
ignored the other four grades, namely, the king, the magnates, the prelates, 
and the proctors, thus providing no yardstick by which the wealth and pres-
tige of the knights and burgesses might be gauged. 
It is hoped that the two trends, one concerned with context and docu-
ments, and the other with the membership, will merge. If historians are to 
understand parliament, and are to communicate to their students some of 
the reasons for its resilience, then the rewriting of parliamentary history is 
essential. If that rewriting requires the restudying of those summoned 
through an examination of the varied aspects of wealth and political, social, 
and territorial connections, and if that rewriting requires historians to re-
evaluate the business of parliament on the basis of edited and hitherto un-
edited documents, then they should be about it. 
35For example: Margery Fletcher, "A study of the knights of the shire returned to 
parliament by Bedfordshire during the Middle ages," London University; A. E. Good-
man, "The parliamentary representation of Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire," Oxford 
University, Magdalen College; J. T. Driver, "The knights of the shire for Worcestershire, 
1377 to 1421," Liverpool University and "Burgess representation of the county of Wilt-
shire, 1422-1437," Oxford University, Oriel College; J. G. Bellamy, "The parliamentary 
representatives of Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, and Staffordshire in the reign of Richard 
II," University of Nottingham; M. G. Webb, "The parliamentary representation of War-
wickshire and Leicestershire, 1377 to 1422," University of Nottingham; K. N. Houghton, 
"The burgesses in the parliaments of Yorkist England," Liverpool University; E. L. T. 
John, "Parliamentary representation of Norfolk and Suffolk in the reigns of Richard II, 
Henry IV, and Henry V," University of Nottingham; E. Fox, "The parliamentary rep-
resentation of the County of Lancaster in the reign of Edward II," University of Man-
chester; A. Rogers, "The parliamentary representation of Surrey and Sussex," University 
of Nottingham. 
36Cuttino, "Medieval Parliament Reinterpreted," p. 687. 
PURITAN MYTHS IN THE BACKGROUND 
OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
WILLIAM F. RICKETSON, JR. 
Myths are important to the historian because they represent generali-
zations about the values held by a particular people in a certain period of 
history. For the purpose of this paper, myths are not necessarily false stories 
( which apparently is the popular view of myths); at least in part, they may 
be true. At the same time, a particular myth may be false because it has 
been shown by historical investigation to be an inaccurate description of 
historical phenomena. 
Charles A. Beard, in an article in the New Republic in 1920, declared 
that "nothing in the realm of ideas was contributed by the Puritans."1 This 
bold pronouncement is an example of mythical thinking in an exaggerated 
form; moreover, it has not stood the test of historical investigation. But there 
are many Puritan myths and some have not been so clearly repudiated. 
Myths about the American Puritans first grew out of their appraisal of them-
selves, in which they emerged as champions of religious freedom and the 
fathers of American democracy. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, iconoclastic schools of historical interpretation attacked the earlier 
myth and produced a new one - a Menckenesque caricature of our fore-
fathers as theocratic overlords with manic-depressive tendencies. Of course, 
neither of these myths is a totally adequate historical description of Puritan 
behavior or Puritan ideals; but, neither one is entirely false. In the cyclical 
process of moving from one myth to another a more realistic approach to the 
historical importance of the American Puritans has been produced in the 
American historiography of the last two and a half decades. 
On the general subject of Puritanism, I stand in the tradition of Perry 
Miller and Edmund S. Morgan, who, in the last two and a half decades, 
have given us less monolithic interpretations than those of the past. But 
their interpretations, unfortunately, do not extend to the area of foreign 
policy. Here there have been no Puritan myths to attack, partly because 
most writers on American diplomatic history begin their studies with the 
formation of the national government. Even those, like Max Savelle, 2 who 
emphasized the colonial origins of traditional American foreign policies, saw 
no distinctive theories on foreign affairs among the Puritans. Nevertheless, 
17. 
1Charles A. Beard, "On Puritans," New Republic, XXV, December, 1920, pp. 15-
2Max H. Savelle, "Colonial Origins of American Diplomatic Principles," Pacific 
Historical Review, III, 1934, pp. 334-350. Also, Max H. Savelle, The Origins of Ameri-
can Diplomacy: The International History of Angloamerica, 1492-1763, New York, 1967. 
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the formation of the New England Confederation showed that the American 
Puritans were concerned with outsiders. They also had relations with Euro-
pean powers and with Indian tribes. They were not a nation-state, but 
Massachusetts Bay brought its charter to the new world, and the granting of 
charters and the revocation of charters in later years took on diplomatic pro-
portions. 
It would be presumptuous of me to think that in this brief essay I could 
give thorough treatment to a neglected area of social history. However, cer-
tain myths concerning Puritan ideas about foreign policies have emerged 
from a study of the annual artillery election sermons preached in Boston by 
Puritan clerics during the colonial period of American history. These ser-
mons show that the Puritans had well developed theories on many of the 
major problems that underlie foreign affairs in any period of time. While it 
is true that no Puritan thinker devoted himself exclusively to the study of 
diplomacy, the ministers in the annual artillery election sermons touched on 
many phases of the subject. 
The artillery election sermons are not to be confused with the regular 
election sermons preached in each colony on the eve of civil elections. The 
latter dealt with various subjects; whereas, the former centered on the sub-
jects of war and peace and were preached each year on the occasion of the 
election of officers by local militia.3 In these sermons there was no con-
scious effort to formulate definite foreign policies. There was, however, a 
conscious effort to deal with practical problems and to make the application 
clear enough to be understood by laymen, who by and large were loyal to 
the clergy. So what began as an attempt to perform a practical function, 
that is, to encourage the militiamen to take their tasks seriously, resulted in 
an expression and delineation of a group consciousness. 4 
3Charles Evans, in 1903, began publication of his American Bibliography. It is a 
chronological dictionary of all books, pamphlets and periodicals printed in the United 
States from the genesis of printing in 1639 down to and including the year 1800. All of 
this material-including all the annual artillery election sermons, beginning in 1672 and 
continuing through the American Revolutionary War-has been microfilmed and is now 
available to scholars in the micro-card editions of Evans' bibliography. 
The artillery election sermons referred to here will be footnoted by citation to 
author, micro-card number, and page number. 
4The sermon became the characteristic institution of American Puritanism. It was 
not, as in England, merely a sectarian expression of a part of the community; it was 
actually "the orthodox manifesto and self-criticism of the community as a whole." 
The militia was by no means an American invention, but the American militia was 
marked by several indigenous characteristics. Its purpose was emphasized by the con-
stant threat of attack by Indians. Also, the lack of a central authority capable of a con-
trolled system of appointment of officers made the militia in America different from its 
counterpart in England which by the seventeenth century had become a device for 
"parade and ostentation by lords-lieutenants." In America, officers were elected by pop-
ular vote of each local militia; this is one of the strongest evidences of democracy in ac-
tion in Puritan New England. However, this practice brought about an informality be-
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With attention centered on the Puritan ministers' reaction to King 
Philip's War, 1675-1678, and the French and Indian War, 1754-1763, my in-
vestigation of these sermons has uncovered definite ideas regarding isola-
tion, arbitration and other foreign policies. The term "myth" has been used 
to connote these ideas because the primary concern here is not with formal 
diplomatic history but with attitudes and, more specifically, with the ide-
ological origins of ce1tain twentieth century American foreign policies. In 
this context, these Puritan ideas, or "myths" since they represent the Puri-
tans' appraisal of themselves, attest to the existence of the following diplo-
matic principles in the colonial period: ( 1) seventeenth century isolation-
ism, ( 2) eighteenth century involvement, that is, involvement with the in-
terests of the British Empire, ( 3) arbitration, ( 4) preparation for war in 
time of peace, and ( 5) a principle of practicability: from an insistence on 
defensive warfare to a justification of offensive warfare. 
( 1) Seventeenth Century Isolationism. Technically the Puritans were 
not a nation; but, in America, they thought of themselves as a nation - the 
New Israel. In this sense, the basic idea in all their foreign relations was 
national honor. To them national honor was an intrinsic part of their doc-
trine of survival and almost synonymous with the idea of national interest. 
It was out of the concept of national honor that their ideas about isolation 
emerged. 
The Puritan thought of his group as the elect of God. Hence the direc-
tions of God for the defense of His chosen people - the children of Israel, 
as given in the scriptures - applied with equal force to the inhabitants of 
New England. The following quotation from the sermon of 1678 evidences 
the speaker's identification of the Puritans in America as Israel in the land 
of Canaan: "God ... keeps some Nations and people unsubdued as he did 
with Israel ... to teach Israel War. So the Lord hath ... given us a good 
Country, yet ... there are some which ... have been left to teach us War." 
Using the same analogy, the speaker described an isolation enforced by 
geographic factors: "Our friendship and favour in the world with any that 
tween officers and men which encouraged desertion when service became inconvenient 
and tended toward a general weakening of the force in combat. These characteristics 
contributed to the creation of a vacuum in the chain of command, resulting in gross in-
efficiency in discipline and ineffectiveness of the militia as a fighting unit. This vacuwn 
was partly filled by the New England clerics who, on the occasion of the annual election 
of officers by the militia, delivered the artillery election sermons. Here Puritan clerics 
often expressed their attitudes toward other colonies and foreign powers as well as their 
ideas about the general subjects of war and peace. Daniel J. Boorstin, The Americans: 
The Colonial Experience, New York, 1958, pp. 10-15. 
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should help us is not much, or our friends lye too far off to help us in time 
of need."5 
Two years earlier there had been "much debate about Auxiliary Aid," 
and that year the sermon carried justification for such aid on biblical 
grounds, citing an instance of Abraham using help, "even heathen help."6 
By 1678 the minister had accepted his people's isolation, even from immedi-
ate neighbors, admitting that "the inhabitants of the land will not join or 
mix with us to make one Body." He emphasized the analogy between the 
Indians and the Canaanites of Bible times on the matter of intermarriage. 
The French, explained the speaker, intermarried with the Indians in the new 
world but the English did not. He then reminded his listener that God in-
tended to destroy the Canaanites ( the Indians) so He forbade Israel ( the 
Puritans) to marry with them. Continuing in this mood, he warned that the 
Canaanites were "to be thorns to them, and Israel was to root them out in 
the conclusion."7 
Anti-catholicism influenced the development of the Puritan policy of 
isolation. While Puritans saw themselves as part of a universal protestant-
ism, it is significant that they associated their cause with the continental 
"variety" of Reformation in Europe. The speaker in 1678 proclaimed: "The 
Lord Jesus is not coming to send peace on the Earth, but the Sword: Ref-
ormation never went on Yet without it, Look at it in Germany or Holland."8 
Prolonging his argument, the Minister spoke in general terms about the 
struggle of protestantism everywhere but made no specific reference to the 
Reformation in England. 
In some instances, the pronouncements of these ministers are less im-
portant than the things they fail to say. The sermons of the seventeenth 
century revealed a marked absence of what was to be the general theme of 
the eighteenth century sermons - a genuine statement of involvement in 
the interests of the British Empire. 
( 2) Eighteenth Century Involvement. The English colonists had, in 
the first three colonial wars, "responded in degree according to how close 
they were to the fighting."9 Now, they were urged to have concern for those 
who fought all over the world. While he described the horrors of war, Amos 
Adams, the speaker in 1759, admonished his listeners: "Shall we not feel for 
5Samuel Nowell, 256, p. 10. 
In this and subsequent quotations no attempt was made to correct spelling to make 
it conform to modern standards. 
6Samuel Willard, 227, p. 20. 
7Nowell, 256, p. 14. 
B[bid., p, 13. 
OCurtis P. Nettels, The Roots of American Civaization, New York, 1939, p. 56. 
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others; shall not the Love of Mankind teach us Compassion to our very 
Enemies. Let us Mourn the Unhappiness of Mankind."10 
In the seventeenth century, the Puritans' thoughts were dominated by 
a doctrine of survival and a concept of national honor. As they progressively 
identified themselves with the Empire in the eighteenth century, the Puri-
tans' national interests were fused with those of Great Britain. This coales-
cence was not disrupted until the period immediately preceding the Ameri-
can Revolution, 1763-1776. 
Lawrence Henry Gipson, who termed the French and Indian War the 
"Great War for the Empire," has also described the first half of the eigh-
teenth century as a period of cooperation between the American colonists 
and the mother country, cooperation in strengthening the British Empire."n 
The speaker in 1756 expressed in classic form the fusing of the Puritans' con-
cept of national honor, at it was expanded in the seventeenth century, with 
a new concept whereby they identified themselves with the national honor 
of the British Empire: "Was it not God that conducted the Siege of Louis-
bourg, ... and open'd the Gates of that City, to a few unexperienced New 
England Men."12 He was referring to the capture of the formidable French 
fort at Louisbourg in 1745. This had been an extremely difficult and highly 
significant accomplishment effected by the joint land forces of New Eng-
landers and the naval forces of Great Britain. Furthermore, the capture of 
this fort was imperative to the interests of both the English colonists and the 
British Empire. However, after the capture, Great Britain, much to the dis-
gust of New Englanders, restored the prize to France in 1748.13 The speaker 
in 1756, by reemphasizing the conquest as an act of God, was disregarding 
earlier anti-British sentiment. 
By 1758 when the war was still going badly for the British, the identi-
fication with British interests was complete. Thomas Barnard, the speaker 
this year, leveled a vigorous attack on Louis XIV, characterizing the French 
king as one who "could Robber like, in Time of profound Peace, overrun 
whole provinces which owed him no subjection." Barnard lamented: "How 
does the Heart of a Briton, glow with grateful Resentment, when he sees 
our venerable Sovereign . . . anxious for the welfare of the most distant 
Comers of his Dominions."14 In the sermon of the following year, Adams 
expanded this identification to include the British Navy: "The British Arms 
10 Amos Adams, 8289, p. 28. 
11 Lawrence Henry Gipson, "The American Revolution as an Aftermath of the Great 
War for the Empire, 1754-1763," Political Science Quarterly, LXV, March, 1950, p. 76. 
12Ebenezear Pemberton, 7749, p. 14. 
13Nettels, op. cit., p. 581. 
14Thomas Barnard, 8079, pp. 23, 29. 
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... are grown respectable; our Navy is become the Envy and Terror of the 
World." He continued, rendering identical the Puritan cause and the cause 
of the Anglo-Saxon Race: "The horrors of war have been the Lot of thou-
sands, perhaps Millions of our own Race." Furthermore, by 1759 there was 
evidence that Adams considered allies of the British their allies also. He re-
ferred to "our German Ally" and to the "Swedes and Russians" as allies in 
the united cause against Louis XIV.16 
The subject of humanitarianism in warfare was noticably not in evi-
dence in the sermons of the seventeenth century, but it was mentioned thir-
teen times in the period of the French and Indian War. Both the ministers· 
preoccupation with concerns of the Empire and their insistence on a human-
itarian spirit in warfare, reflect a change in the colonists· attitude toward 
themselves. 
According to Perry Miller, the first Puritans came to America on an 
Errand, not a Mission. They came to establish a New Garden of Eden which 
would furnish leadership for a "Calvinist Internationale" once the reforma-
tion had reached fruition in England. But when the Protestant movement 
in England under Cromwell moved obliquely toward religious toleration, 
the American Puritans, holding fast to their ideals, experienced a sense of 
political disinheritance which lasted throughout King Philip's War and the 
first three colonial wars.16 Seventeenth century Puritans, saturated with a 
sense of negativism, were psychologically introverted as well as politically 
disinherited. But by the middle of the eighteenth century, they seem, as a 
people, to have reached a level of maturity sound enough to afford a spirit 
of cooperation with friends and empathy even toward enemies. In the early 
years of the French and Indian War, there was evidence that worldwide in-
terest and humanitarian concern, both dormant during most of the seven-
teenth century, were revived by the Puritan ministers. 
In 1756 the soldiers were exhorted to show themselves to be fighting on 
God's side by their humanitarian regard for those against whom they fought. 
In contrast to the Caesars with their lust for power, Christian soldiers were 
called to "Nobler Motives."17 Two years before the end of the war, Jason 
Haven admonished the soldiers to copy the humanitarian spirit of the Bri-
tish Sovereign, George III: 
Among his many royal accomplishments, the humanity and gentle-
ness of spirit, which he appeared possessed of, were none of the 
least; .... Tho' he manifested a surprising firmness of mind, in his 
111 Adams, 8289, pp. 26-28. 
16Cf. Perry Miller, Errand Into the Wilderness, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1956. 
17Pemberton, 7749, pp. 10-11. 
PuluTAN MYTHS rn THE BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POI.ICY 19 
close attention to, and vigorous support of the present war; ... Yet 
so susceptible was his heart of the softer passions, that he always 
preferred peace to war, when it could be obtained upon terms hon-
orable to his crown.18 
In this manner, the speaker synthesized the colonists' imperial orientation 
with their humanization of warfare. Reorientation and reinvestment in the 
political interest of the Empire also affected the colonists' attitude toward 
arbitration. 
( 3) Arbitration. Seventeenth century Puritans were willing to accept 
help and at times give it to their friends, but arbitration required compro-
mise and the principles involved in the covenant relationship of the Puritans 
with God could not be compromised. Urian Oakes, president of Harvard 
College, in his eloquent sermon of 1677 gave voice to the Puritan limitation 
in the area of arbitration: "All the Counsels ... of the ablest Statesmen, ... 
how rational soever, shall not prosper without him.''19 Also the lack of in-
terest in arbitration was in part a product of the anti-catholic aspect of the 
covenant. According to Nowell, the speaker in 1678, there was no use, in 
fact no honorable way, to arbitrate with anyone outside the community of 
the elect: "Rome will have no peace with you, and you ought to have no 
peace with it, .... If their Counsels should happen to sway the World, it is 
a vain thing for us to promise ourselves peace."20 
It has been said that there was a dearth of significant arbitration in the 
eighteenth century. 21 However, in the sermons during this period, there 
were over twice as many references to arbitration as in the seventeenth cen-
tury. While it may be true that arbitration in this period "had little juridic 
character,''22 there was considerable attention given to arbitration by the 
ministers who spoke to the militia. The first mention was in 1756. Here 
Pemberton laid the blame for the breakdown of arbitration on France: 
No sooner was Peace proclaimed, but France immediately pre-
pared for the Commencement of a new War, .... They artfully de-
bauched our Indian Allies from their Allegiance to the Crown of 
Great Britain, .... This is the policy of France, falsehoods which 
turned Indians against the British and set them committing bar-
barous acts against English "unwalled villages.'' 
The speaker maintained his attack on the French by rationalizing Britain's 
resort to warfare: "When the Faith of Treaties is violated, ... it becomes 
18Jason Haven, 8878, p. 23. 
19Urian Oakes, 326, pp. 18-25. 
20Nowell, 256, p. 14. 
21Elton Trueblood, The Development of the Peace Idea, Norwood, Massachusetts, 
1932, p. 20. 
22]bid. 
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the immediate Duty of the supreme Magistrate, to have recourse to Arms; 
... and put a stop to the Progress of Tyranny and Usurpation."23 
The culmination of identification with Britain in arbitration was ex-
pressed by Jason Haven in the sermon of 1761: 
An example of the late Sovereign's humanitarian spirit of love and 
peace was the overtures of peace which he made to his old per-
fidious enemies the French; at a time when success attended all 
his military enterprises. . . . The happy effects of this gentle spirit 
... have been sensibly felt; and gratefully acknowledged, by his 
most dutiful subjects in these American colonies.24 
Hence the colonists' new attitude toward arbitration was, again, part of their 
imperial orientation. 
( 4) Preparation for War in Time of Peace. The Puritan clerics insisted 
that self-interest was in keeping with common sense, natural law and divine 
law. Of course, it was self-interest as related to the elect. Thereupon, the 
soldiers were consistently urged to be concerned about their own interests. 
To Joshua Moodey, in 1674, it seemed sensible to assume that if the Puri-
tans' enemies heard the truth of their preparation and came to think of them 
as "being a warlike people," there would be less likelihood of attack. It was 
preparation to prevent war and it was based on common sense. But Moodey 
also appealed to natural law in arguing for preparation: "Sure God had 
given to all other Creatures an Instinct to preserve themselves, . . . and in 
the meantime left man like a tame Fool to be Prey to his adversar-
ies." Adding a final satiric note, Moodey warned that if they renounced the 
instinct of self-preservation they would have to recreate themselves. Thus 
it was clear that this minister thought of natural law as subservient to divine 
law.25 
In 1676, during the height of King Philip's War, the emphasis was on 
the importance of well constructed forts, with an ominous reminder that "we 
dwell among Murderers."26 Throughout the last phase of the war, 1677-1678, 
there was a gradual return to the central idea that the best way to prepare 
for peace was to prepare for war. By 1678 the appeal to common sense, 
natural law and divine law was again invoked. With regard to Inilitary 
preparation, Samuel Nowell proclaimed that "the law of nature commands 
it," and reason verified it. The Indians saw they had the skill, explained the 
speaker: "that Skill in Military discipline ... that was an awe and dread to 
them, and is at this day, that they dare not meet us on equal terms."27 
23Pemberton, 7749, p. 20. 
24Haven, 8878, pp. 23-24. 
25Joshua Moodey, 193, pp. 32, 40. 
26Willard, 227, pp. 3, 18. 
27Nowell, 256, pp. 8, 12. 
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By the 1686 the cycle was completed and ironically in that year Cotton 
Mather emphasized the same phrase that had been the central theme of the 
sermon of 1674: "A time of Peace is the Time to prepare for a time of war." 
Lamenting the decline in military discipline, Mather warned that: "The 
want of Preparation in us, may sharpen the Edge of an Enemies Desire for 
our Land."28 
The central idea of the policy of military preparedness, before King 
Philip's War, was that it was the best way to prevent war. This notion gave 
way, during the French and Indian War, to the idea that just warfare pro-
moted peace. According to Thomas Barnard, in the sermon of 1758: 
"Angels ... rejoice to do God's Will even when they destroy thousands in a 
Night, for the Peace and Safety of those whom God delights to bless."29 
The striking contrast, between speakers of the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries, in their attitudes toward preparation for war is probably 
symptomatic of, and at least consistent with, a radical change in theology. 
All of the seventeenth century speakers were "pre millennialists" who, fatal-
istically, accepted the inevitability of war, awaiting the second coming of 
Christ. On the other hand, most of the speakers during the eighteenth cen-
tury were "post-millennialists," who believed that God was already acting 
through man to make conditions better and better until peace was achieved 
on earth, and man's participation in wars was a part of the process. In 1760 
the militiamen were reassured: "So the repeated disasters we met with, in 
the beginning of this war, have been over-ruled for our advantage - God 
brings his people low in order to exalt them the higher."30 
This radical change in theology is only one of many evidences, found in 
the artillery elections sermons, of the adaptability of these Puritan ministers; 
the liberalization of their ideas concerning "just warfare" is another evidence 
that attests to their practicability. 
( 5) A Principle of Practicability: From an Insistence on Defensive 
Warfare to a Justification of Offensive Warfare. Immediately preceding 
King Philip's War, Joshua Moodey explained that the right of defensive war 
was justified by the doctrine of pre-destination supported by original sin.31 
At the end of the war in 1678, the emphasis placed on the justification of 
war plus an awareness of the rectitude of the Puritan cause, led the speaker 
to warrant participation in offensive warfare; he gave lucid justification for 
taking up arms for such as are confederate with us, ... from this example of 
28Cotton Mather, 421, pp. 12, 20. 
29Barnard, 8079, p. 32. 
30Dunbar, 8586, p. 17. 
31Moodey, 193, pp, 3, 33. 
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Abraham and his confederate, that were engaged in a league, offensive and 
defensive."32 
It is significant that offensive warfare was not justified until the end of 
King Philip's War. There were two important factors involved in the war 
which seem contradictory. Out of this apparent contradiction evolved the 
Puritan concept of offensive warfare. The Puritans always insisted that a 
war in which they became involved should be a just war, and yet they were 
aware that this war had been essentially a struggle for land. Now, prior to 
the war the only reference to defensive warfare was an assertion that they 
would be justified in recovering lands taken away from them.33 Through-
out the war, these ministers never revealed that they saw any contradiction 
in these two factors. Still, the right to fight an offensive war was not pro-
nounced until the post-war period, 1678-1686, when, to the two justifiable 
causes for war already accepted, one, for defense of themselves, and two, to 
recover what had been taken away, a third cause was added: "To punish 
for injuries done."34 Thus the doctrine of "War Guilt," whereby the enemy 
had to pay for the war, was introduced into colonial America, adding justi-
fication to the Puritan concept of offensive warfare. 
Prior to the outbreak of the French and Indian War, a strict policy of 
defensive warfare was outlined. In 1751 the speaker said that the calling 
of the soldier was to defend the country "from invasion," and when this was 
their function, their role was "an honorable one."35 
In 1759, after the war had turned in favor of England, the speaker re-
peatedly used the term "defensive warfare;" however, in this case it had an 
unusual meaning; the biblical source cited to support the contention that the 
Puritans were fighting to defend the elect was "the Charge to the Israelites 
to be the Executioners of Vengeance upon the Canaanitish Nation."36 This 
special meaning could not be passed off as idiosyncratic because a similar 
metamorphosis of the concept of just warfare also took place in the seven-
teenth century. At the beginning of each war, the speakers were content to 
insist on the right to defensive warfare, more specifically, a just war had to 
be one of resistance to invasion. Toward the end, the concept was expanded 
to include the right to punish the enemy. The concept of "War Guilt," in-
troduced at the end of King Philip's War, was reintroduced toward the end 
of the French and Indian War. Overall, the ideas about defensive warfare 
followed very nearly the same pattern in the early and the later periods. 
32Nowell, 256, p. 6. 
33Moodey, 193, p. 6. 
34Nowell, 256, p. 4. 
35Samuel Cooper, 6655, pp. 12, 13. 
36Adams, 8289, p. 14. 
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In summary, a stereoscopic view of the early era pictures the Puritans 
as politically disinherited and psychologically introverted, with a negative 
theology of pre-millennialism and a foreign policy of isolation. The inertia 
of the early era was a result, among other things, of their sense of disinher-
itance and guilt because of the failure of their errand and an economic depri-
vation. This pervasive inertia found expression in an other-worldly theology, 
and it permeated their foreign policy - a policy dominated by a concern 
for their own mere survival. 
A belief in progress, in the ability of man to improve himself and his 
fellowman, came out of the Great Awakening. Doubtless, this contributed to 
the energetic character of the later era. During this era of political restora-
tion, the American Puritans became psychologically extroverted, their the-
ology was directed toward the fulfillment of God's kingdom on earth, and 
their foreign policy became one of involvement and identification with the 
interests of the British Empire, even when these interests involved or neces-
sitated arbitration. 
To suppose that these clerics consciously changed their theology ac-
cording to practical considerations is to read into the motives of these min-
isters a note of hypocrisy, a characteristic which is not only unsubstantiated 
but not even necessary in order to understand their contributions. Simply 
stated, they were men of high ideals but they were also practical minded 
men. Samuel Cooper, in the sermon of 1751, succinctly summarized the 
Puritan ministers' agony when he protested that it was unfortunate for the 
world that "the Profession of a Soldier" had become necessary, and in con-
clusion resolved: "We must deal with things as they are not as they ought 
to be."37 
Finally, these men possessed a flexibility of mind and spirit, enabling 
them to adapt their sermons to the needs of their people. Even in times of 
peace, they lived in a hostile environment, and advocated preparation for 
war. When war came they were forceful in justifying it, but when the im-
minent danger was past, they expressed a sense of guilt. Witness the dra-
matic lamentation of Urian Oakes in 1677: "Who sees not that God's Design 
is to humble proud New England?"38 Still, it was more than an expression 
of guilt; it was the Puritans' attempt to return to their ideal, to live just and 
honorable lives at peace with their fellowmen. 
87Cooper, 6655, p. 12. 
3SOakes, 326, p. 28. 
SOCIALIZED MEDICINE -
SOME ASPECTS OF THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 
J.M. THORN 
The British National Health Service has been condemned, lauded, re-
jected out of hand, and held up as an example for all civilized men to fol-
low. However, there is a large element of tilting at windmills in the ever 
present debate on the merits or demerits of socialized medicine in England. 
Beneath all the highsounding phrases one very soon finds an astonishing 
dearth of facts relative to the actual workings and effectiveness of the ser-
vice. Some years ago an economist remarked that "we are told so little about 
the work of the National Health Service that we might well be amazed at 
Parliament's willingness to go on voting vast sums for it on little more than 
the unproven affirmation that the money is needed."1 Of course myriad 
statistics have been amassed; yet to this day the government does not know 
who uses the service, how often, in what areas of cost, or with what results. 
This is a lamentable weakness in a program absorbing four per cent of the 
gross national product per annum. 2 Ultimately not only does it obscure ac-
curate evaluation of the clinical significance of socialized medicine in Eng-
lish society, but it hinders necessary efforts to adjust the workings of the 
health service to meet new challenges. This paper then has a dual purpose; 
putting all ideology aside, it simply seeks to measure the achievements of 
the National Health Service against its declared goals, while it indicates 
several critical instances where lack of detailed information may seriously 
compromise the ideals of the service. 
July 5, 1948 stands as a watershed in modem English history; on that 
day the National Health Insurance Act of November, 1946 came into opera-
tion. If the Act is long and complex, its basic premises emerge clearly 
enough in the initial section which instructs the Minister of Health 
to promote the establishment in England and Wales of a compre-
hensive health service designed to secure improvement in the phy-
sical and mental health of the people of England and Wales and 
the prevention, diagnoses and treatment of illness; and for that 
purpose to provide or secure the effective provision of services in 
accordance with the following provision of this Act. a 
lF, Laffite, The Health Services: Some of Their Practical Problems, London, 1951, 
p. 99. 
2For the year ending March 31, 1966 expenditure on the National Health Service 
was 1,241,000,000 pounds, four per cent of the gross national product. Lancet, July 15, 
1966. 
3The National Health Service in Scotland was created by a separate Act in May, 
1947. While it is not a mere copy of the English service, much of its general plan is 
similar. 
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Further ... "The service so provided shall be free of charge, except where 
any provision of this Act expressly provides for the making and recovery of 
charges." Nationalization of all hospitals ( with very few exceptions) was 
one of the more controversial means adopted for securing "the effective pro-
visions of services." Any doctor wishing to practice under the auspices of 
the new health service was to receive a basic salary with a capitation fee 
for each patient treated. The necessary funds to support a new free health 
service were to come from two sources - compulsory insurance of the entire 
population and general taxation. Today it appears that taxation supplies 
about seventy-two per cent of the necessary revenue. In short, with good 
health and the prevention of illness in all men irrespective of wealth or class 
as its primary objectives, the National Health Service was deliberately con-
ceived as both universal and free. 
But given these noble hopes certain questions arise. The National 
Health Service will celebrate its majority this year. How successful has it 
been in improving the health of the nation by preventing illness? Has the 
quality of medical treatment dispensed under the National Health Service, 
allowing for medical advances, risen over that characteristic of previous 
years? Has the belief that medicine could be free as well as universal be-
come a financial chimaera in a country beset by serious economic problems? 
One of the potential benefits claimed for the National Health Service at 
its inception rested on the premise that it would be a more suitable clinical 
instrument than private practice for improving standards of health through 
prevention of illness.4 It might thereby even stimulate greater national 
wealth. How has it fulfilled these expectations? Certainly many of the 
scourges traditionally afflicting large numbers of the lower economic groups 
in the pre-war years - lobar pneumonia, late syphilis, rickets, rheumatic 
fever, scarlet fever, dyptheria - are no longer major problems.5 Recent 
statistics for infant and maternity mortality record great improvements in 
the last twenty years. 6 Life expectancy for both sexes by 1958 had exceeded 
the figure for 1932 by nearly ten years. Thus acknowledging the numerous 
variables involved in a nation's state of health - higher standards of living, 
better nutrition, better housing and education - it is reasonable to suppose 
that socialized medicine deserves a good share of credit for these improved 
health and mortality statistics. For example, the significant fall in neonatal 
mortality between 1946 and 1950, a short period of time, is surely due more 
to better preventive medicine than long term changes in life style.7 
4Francis Williams, Socialist Britain, New York, 1949, p. 118. 
5Robert Kemp, "Morbidity and Social Class," Lancet, June 17, 1967. 
6See the tables provided by Matthew J. Lynch and Stanley S. Raphael, Medicine 
and the State, Springfield, 1963, pp. 330-331. 
7The neonatal death rate fell from 24.5 per 1000 in 1946 to 18.5 in 1950. James 
S. Ross, The National Health Service in Great Britain, Oxford, 1952, p. 186. 
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Unfortunately, tentative private investigation on a local level suggests a 
disquieting paradox hardly foreseen by politicians in the immediate post-war 
years. The National Health Service predicated much illness as either avoid-
able infection or the results of deprivation of preventive medical care 
through lack of money. Yet the lower economic groups who ought to have 
benefited most apparently still constitute the same hospital class as they did 
in the 1930's. Why? In part this may be explained by the survival of size-
able numbers of families with below subsistence incomes, or widespread re-
fusal to consult a doctor in time. 8 A less well know reason is perhaps a dra-
matic change in disease pattern. More prevalent ailments in many working 
class people may fast be becoming so-called self induced diseases of afflu-
ence - obesity, alcoholism, lung cancer, etc.9 Donne's remark "though I do 
nothing and yet I am mine own executioner" is apt. This phenomenon de-
serves wider study for its implications should disturb any government which 
directly underwrites the health of its citizenry. It seems that the health ser-
vice has radically altered the patterns of disease without necessarily reduc-
ing the sum total of ill health as was originally hoped. Is this a law of na-
ture or a question of educating people? Almost incidentally any economic 
externalities which might hopefully result from preventive medicine fall 
quietly by the wayside.10 Moreover the quality of treatment given in other 
sectors of the service cannot be separated from success or failure in preven-
tive medicine. 
Although the National Health Service Act makes no direct claims for 
the superior quality of socialized medicine per se, its architect, Aneurin 
Bevan, had no doubts that state intervention would give better medicine 
than private practice was generally capable of, as well as making it available 
to all.11 By contrast Lynch and Raphael in their book Medicine and the 
State repudiate Bevan's statements completely, asserting that quality has 
suffered from socialized medicine. 12 Who is correct? Completely lacking 
any comprehensive studies of either the working conditions of the general 
practitioner or the effectiveness of his treatment for the years 1948 to 1966, 
we have to rely for the most part on individual analyses of patterns in local 
SUsing National Assistance scales as a rough guide, Peter Townsend has argued 
that seven to eight million people, fourteen per cent of the total population, have in-
comes inadequate for a healthy diet. Peter Townsend, Poverty, Socialism, and Labour in 
Power, London, 1966. 
9Kemp, op. cit. 
lOThe Guillebaud Committee reporting in 1956 on the costs of the health service, 
hailed it as "wealth-producing." This is a very debatable point. Dennis S. Lees, "The 
Economics of Health," Lloyds Bank Review, April, 1960. 
llAneurin Bevan, In Place of Fear, New York, 1952, p. 79. 
12Lynch and Raphael, op. cit., passim. 
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areas.13 These usually suggest that doctors see too many patients, spend in-
sufficient time listening or examining, and frequently give treatment based 
on unsound diagnoses. Add to this the angry resolution of the British Medi-
cal Association in July, 1965 threatening mass resignation unless doctors 
were permitted to charge fees to discourage hypochondriacs, frivolous com-
plainers, etc. who were allegedly producing a crisis in the quality of medi-
cine and the picture is bleak indeed. However, these difficulties are not 
peculiar to socialized medicine and do not fully represent the English situa-
tion. The Peterson Report of 1956 investigating the working conditions of 
ninety-four general practitioners in North Carolina found that they too see 
an excessive number of patients, lack time for satisfactory diagnoses and so 
on.14 Whatever the explanation, figures showing the rate of annual per 
capita visits to doctors in the United States during the 1950's were higher 
than those in Britain.15 Again the valuable work of Paul Gemmill, Britain's 
Search for Health,16 published in 1960 shows that thirty-seven per cent of a 
sample fifteen hundred National Health Service patients felt they were get-
ting better medical care than they did before 1948; only thirteen per cent 
found it worse. As to the burden of practice, fifty-nine per cent of the four 
hundred National Health Service doctors he interviewed found it reasonably 
easy to give adequate care to their panel lists; thirty-nine per cent found it 
difficult, three per cent found it impossible. 
So evidence on the quality of treatment given under the National 
Health Service is ambiguous. To some extent this is acceptable. Quality is 
a subjective concept. But governmental failure to investigate this question 
in all its aspects does the service great harm. With medical skills in great 
demand, the prerequisite of any effective service should be a close, continu-
ing search for those methods of organization and work which will produce 
the best in quality. Assuming socialized medicine had not been introduced 
in 1948, standards might have become higher than they are within the Na-
tional Health Service for the more prosperous minority always able to pur-
chase its health needs. For those who previously could not afford to see a 
doctor or received makeshift treatment because the doctor was unwilling to 
increase his list of bad debts through more expensive treatment, quality has 
surely risen. Whether, as some claim, rising incomes in the post-war years 
would have enabled private medicine to equal or surpass this pedormance is 
a matter of conjecture. 
13The Ministry of Health completed its first review of the family doctor service since 
1948 in 1966. Annual Report of The Ministry af Health f<>r the year 1966, London, 1966. 
A valuable local study of conditions in Lancashire and North Wales is "How General 
Practitioners Use Their Time," The British Medical Journal, December 24, 1966. 
14]bid. 
H"What is Value for Money in Medical Care?," Lancet, April 8, 1967 
16Paul F. Gemmill, Britain's Search f<>r Health, Philadelphia, 1960. 
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It is best not to be blinded by professional unhappiness either. There 
is justifiable dissatisfaction over salaries. Misues of doctors' time has been 
and remains a considerable problem. On the other hand, according to 
Lancet, the general practitioner has not fared so badly in financial terms 
under the National Health Service. Much of the present controversy over 
money may really reflect anxiety over status at a time when the widening 
gap between general practitioner and specialist threatens the farmer's pres-
tige.17 The British Medical Association itself, in its salary recommendations 
for junior members and house officers, has tended to be less generous than 
the government.18 Harry Eckstein's interesting study of the "Politics of the 
British Medical Association" written in 1955 shows clearly that whatever is 
said now, the B.M.A.'s swift reconciliation to socialized medicine between 
1948 and 1955 was due to a realization that "the clinical effectiveness of 
medical practice did not depend on its traditional private organization and 
has not been harmed by socialization".19 
The National Health Service promised better preventive medicine and 
the best available care to all men. It also promised that services provided 
could and should be "free". So they remain except for certain specific ap-
pliances such as dentures, glasses, etc. Still, there is growing conviction in 
many quarters, within or outside government, that this committment is pro-
ducing a financial crisis for the National Health Service which is impairing 
its performance. The most agile academic exponent of this viewpoint is 
Arthur Seldon, currently editorial director of the Institute of Economic Af-
fairs in London. 20 According to Seldon the health service is experiencing 
financial crisis at the very time when much greater sums must be invested if 
present services, let alone new ones corresponding to medical advances, are 
to be maintained. Raising taxes might be a temporary solution but in 
Seldon's opinion this only diverts attention from the real cause of trouble -
the insistence on universally free treatment. The principles of 1948 reflected 
a purely transitory situation when large numbers who have since benefited 
from full employment with rising incomes were not in a position to pay the 
market price for good health. It is now foolishly wasteful to give free medi-
cine to one hundred per cent of the populace to insure that the ten or fifteen 
per cent who cannot pay, get it. It is inhumane too, as Professor B. Abel-
Smith admits, because it fails to concentrate maximum help where it is 
17"Motes and Beams," Lancet, January 7, 1967. See also Gordon Forsyth, Doctors 
and State Medicine, London, 1966. 
lSRichard Titmuss, The Times (London), November 6, 1966. 
19Harry Eckstein, "The Politics of the British Medical Association," in Studies in 
British Politics, ed. Richard Rose, New York, 1966, p. 234. 
20Arthur Seldon, "Crisis in the Welfare State," Encounter, December, 1967, pp. 56-
65. See also his articles "National or Personal Health Service," Lancet, March 25, 1967 
and "Prospects for Private Health Insurance," The British Medical Journal, July 15, 1967. 
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needed, "giving it where it is not." Seldon's conclusion is clear - a financi-
ally sound free health service, utilizing the best in medical techniques for 
everybody, is unworkable; free benefits must be limited to those in need. 
Supporters of the health service will object to Seldon's formula for se-
lectivity, but his criticisms must be taken seriously. Contrary to popular be-
liefs at least, the National Health Service has always been under-financed 
for carrying out its enormous tasks. Expenditure on the National Health 
Service from 1949 to 1966 only rose from 3.4 per cent to 4 per cent of the 
gross national product ( the equivalent percentage in several other European 
societies is higher). A similar percentage of the gross national product was 
probably taken up by health in 1938. Moreover, expenditure on health has 
fallen from 27 per cent of the total social service budget in 1949 to 24 per 
cent in 1959.21 Possibly in the more affluent Sixties reliance of the health 
service upon taxation is its greatest weakness. Since all democratic govern-
ments recognize that there are limits beyond which taxation has harmful 
political and economic effects, much of the new purchasing power generated 
after World War II cannot be tapped for health. The health service is con-
tinually competing with other government programs for a share of taxation. 
There are already indications that some prominent politicians even 
within the Labour Party are, for reasons similar to those above, carefully 
reappraising welfare policy. Mr. Ray Gunter, Minister of Labour in Mr. 
Wilson's government until the latter part of.1967, and Mr. Patrick Gordon-
Walker, Minister Without Portfolio in 1967, have urged the principle of 
charges for those who can pay.22 The Chairman of the Parliamentary La-
bour Pa1ty, Douglas Houghton, recently initiated a parliamentary debate in 
which he spoke out against indiscriminate free benefits. His pamphlet "Pay-
ing for the Social Services" couples payments for all medical services with a 
plan to return such payments to all those who through their income tax cod-
ing can be identified as in need. 23 Of course all this concern points to a 
moral. Periodic alarm over the costs of the health service almost since its 
birth, has led to no attempts to find out precisely who uses the service, how 
often, and in what areas. 24 Only in 1966 did the Ministry of Health com-
21Dennis S. Lees, "An Economist Considers Other Alternatives," Financing Medi-
cal Care, ed. Helmut Schoeck, Idaho, 1962, p. 54. 
22For Mr. Gunter's speech of August 19, 1967 see The Times (London), August 
20, 1967. Mr. Gordon-Walker revealed his thoughts to a seminar in Extra-Mural Studies 
at Cambridge on June 18, 1967. The British Medical Journal, July 15, 1967. 
23Douglas Houghton, Paying for the Social Services, Occasional Paper 16, Institute 
of Economic Affairs, London, 1967. 
24 It is true that the Guillebaud Committee did not recommend reducing the costs 
of the health service, but it made no attempt to find out who used the service and other 
particulars. Richard M. Titmuss, "The Irresponsible Society," The Listener, August 11, 
1960. 
30 THE SOUTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 
pile its first major review of the family doctor service. Instead, there has 
been a crude concentration upon mere resource input, which probably stiin-
ulates demand, which in tum is used to justify further input. 
To the generation who have grown up since 1948 socialized medicine 
is taken for granted as part of daily living. Few consider its impact on them-
selves or ask whether it has been a worthwhile experiment. And even he 
who asks will find his answers admit of no siinple negative or affirmative. 
Perhaps the fairest verdict on socialized medicine in England confounds its 
harshest critics and disappoints its strongest supporters. In preventive medi-
cine progress has been made, though many either fail to consult in time or 
through their way of living are busy spawning self-inflicted illness unforseen 
by the National Health Service Act. Despite professional ambivalence on 
the quality of treatment, in relative terms the many probably receive as good 
or better care than they did before 1948. However, economic difficulties 
may well force a British government in the near future to reject former be-
liefs that all are entitled to free medicine. Such restructuring of the Na-
tional Health Service will inevitably produce bitter political recrimination, 
particularly if it falls to a Labour government to carry it through. A free 
National Health Service has been part of Labour ideology since 192225 and 
has the same sort of sanctity as Clause Four on nationalization. Mr. Gunter 
finds it necessary to deny that selective benefits resurrect the hated means 
tests of the Thirties. Yet the problem cannot be evaded indefinitely and 
should not be. The National Health Service has been described as a great 
social experiment. An experiment becomes a failure if the results obtained 
are not accepted, and the original objectives for the completed project 
are not revised according to the evidence gained from the experiinent. 
25Arthur Maiwick, "The Labour Party and the Welfare State in Britain 1900-1948," 
American Historical Review, LXXIII, 1967, pp. 380-403. 
DOLLARS FROM SCHOLARS: 
THE WISCONSIN ALUMNI RESEARCH FOUNDATION'° 
EDWARD H. BEARDSLEY 
One of the most frequent complaints of American scientists, from the 
late colonial period down to World War II, was that American society was 
unwilling to provide adequate support for basic scientific research.1 In 1925 
a group of scientists, administrators, and alumni of the University of Wis-
consin took steps to remedy that deficiency - within the confines of at 
least one institution - by creating the Wisconsin Alumni Research Founda-
tion (WARF), a corporation whose aim was to promote research by com-
mercial exploitation of scientific discovery. Organized in response to an im-
portant nutritional breakthrough made in 1924 by College of Agriculture 
biochemist Harry Steenbock, the Foundation actually had its origins in 
events occurring much earlier. 
In the first years of the twentieth century a few scientists and univer-
sity officials, aware of the financial needs of research, began to consider 
ways of using the patent process in support of scientific investigation. Out 
of such deliberations came several fairly successful ventures in patent ex-
ploitation. In 1911 the Smithsonian Institution promoted the creation of a 
private group known as the Research Corporation, whose function was to 
manage patents donated by a Columbia University engineer, returning all 
earnings to the Smithsonian to support further research. 2 Six years later 
regents of the University of California, having received several patents from 
one of the medical faculty, elected to manage the licensing business them-
selves. Royalties went to support additional medical investigation. 3 
'°Beardsley's paper is taken from his biographical study of Wisconsin scientist H. L. 
Russell, to be published in December, 1969 by the University of Wisconsin Press. 
lSee for example Samuel Miller, Brief Retrospect of the Eighteenth Century, 1803 
in William and Mary Quarterly 3d ser., 1953, 579-627; also see Howard S. Miller, 
"Science and Private Agencies," in David Van Tassel and Michael Hall, Science and 
Society in the United States, Homewood, Illinois, 1966, pp. 191-222. 
2 Archie Maclnnes Palmer, "University Patent Policies," Journal of The Patent 
Office Society, February, 1934; Science, n.s., October 19, 1917, 372-73; Charles Gree-
ley Abbot, Adventures in the World of Science, Washington, 1958, pp. 99-100. Early 
research foundations appeared in other countries besides the United States. In 1906 a 
research corporation was established at the University of Toronto. That foundation took 
on new life in 1924 when Banting and Best donated their insulin patents to it. Fore-
runners of WARF in Europe were the Solvay Institute in Brussells and the institute 
founded by German scientist Paul Erlich to exploit his cure for syphilis. See Science, 
n.s., XLVI, October 19, 1917, 372-73. 
3Science, n.s., XLVI, October 19, 1917, 371-375; Palmer, "University Patent Poli-
cies," Journal of Patent Office Society, February, 1934. One university considered the 
foundation question ahead of California but took no positive action on the matter be-
yond setting policy lines. In 1913 the University of Illinois instructed all faculty mem-
bers that thereafter they had to assign all patent rights on their discoveries to the Uni-
versity. Although provision was made for University personnel to administer any patents 
coming out of the laboratories, little activity was in evidence in the years following. 
Other universities were quite critical of Illinois' attempt to force patent assignment. 
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California's action attracted wide attention in academic circles. Al-
though many scientists opposed patenting as a breech of professional ethics, 
the journal, Science, hailed the California plan as an important step in the 
liberation of American research. For too long, the editors lamented, investi-
gators had had to depend on those with no real understanding of science to 
supply its material wants. As a result, important areas of research which 
failed to appeal to the popular fancy had been unable to get adequate sup-
port. What American science needed was an automatic mechanism which 
could return to it a fair share of the wealth it created. The California 
scheme, Science believed, had such possibilities and deserved the considera-
tion of other universities.4 
By the 1920's an increasing number of scientists and others were con-
cerned with the need to make research self-supporting. In 1921 two Chicago 
professionals, William Hoskins, a consulting chemist, and Russell Wiles, a 
patent lawyer, gave their attention to the question of patent exploitation. 
The university foundation scheme they devised was to exert a large influ-
ence on the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation. 
Wiles and Hoskins' plan differed from that adopted at Berkley in that 
their foundation, while allied to a university, was completely independent of 
it. American educational institutions, they believed, were simply not 
equipped to run an efficient commercial operation. Moreover, there was a 
strong popular prejudice against combining educational with business func-
tions. What was needed was a corporation managed by outside friends of 
a university. Such a plan would provide the benefits of patent exploitation 
without the headaches of commercial operation. The university's only re-
sponsibility would be the administration of foundation grants. Initially, 
those grants should be small, in order to devote the bulk of royalty income 
to the creation of an endowment which could give continuing support to re-
search. 6 
The deliberations of the two Chicagoans were timely, so far as events 
at Wisconsin were concerned, for soon afterwards biochemist Steenbock 
made his startling discovery linking ultra-violet radiation of food with the 
creation in food of the anti-rachitic property, vitamin D. Since the natural 
availability of the vitamin was extremely limited, Steenbock's research had 
obvious relevance for human health, particularly in combatting bone de-
4Science, n.s., XLVI, October 19, 1917, 371-72. 
5William Hoskins and Russell Wiles, "Promotion of Scientific Research," Chemi-
cal and Metallurgical Engineering, XXIV, April 20, 1921, 689-91. For evidence that 
the Hoskins-Wiles touched off a vigorous discussion of the foundation idea, see ibid., 
XXV, November 16, 1921, 913, and ibid., XXVI, February 15, 1922, 293. 
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ficiencies in children. 6 In 1924, his findings fully confirmed, Steen bock de-
cided to patent the irradiation technique. He knew such a step would sub-
ject him to criticism. But he felt the advantages of patenting, particularly 
the ability to block the use of the process by the oleomargarine industry, 
outweighed objections. 7 
What to do with the patent once he obtained it, however, was a per-
plexing problem. His professional sensibilities militated against selling it. 
On the other hand, managing its exploitation himself was unthinkable, for 
there would not be time to act the role of businessman and continue his re-
search career, too. As for the University undertaking patent management, 
that avenue also looked unpromising. A few years before, when he dis-
covered a method of isolating vitamin A, the regents had shown no interest 
in commercial exploitation. 8 
It was then that a colleague in Chicago called his attention to the 
Hoskins-Wiles plan. Steenbock felt it offered just the solution for which he 
was searching, and on his return to Madison he approached his College dean, 
H. L. Russell, to get his reaction. 9 
Russell was immediately interested. He not only appreciated the finan-
cial possibilities of the plan; he also believed that scientific patent was some-
times in the public interest. When a scientist made society a free gift of his 
idea, the public applauded but were often the last to benefit, for unregu-
lated business use often turned into commercial abuse.10 
6Russell, Report of the Director, 1920-1921, p. 135; 1921-1922, pp. 10, 13; 1922-
1923, p. 87; 1924-1926, p. 121. Also see Paul de Kruif, Hunger Fighters, New York, 
1928, pp. 299-330 for a lively but technically accurate account of Steenbock's discovery. 
7Robert Taylor, "The Birth of the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation," un-
published manuscript, 1956, in the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation Manuscripts 
and Records, WARF Office, Madison, Wisconsin; also see Morrison to Russell, Decem-
ber 14, 1925, WARF Manuscripts and Records, for Steenbock's concern to protect the 
dairy industry; also see Wilbur H. Glover, Farm and College. The College of Agricul-
ture of the University of Wisconsin: A History, Madison, 1952, p. 294. 
BGlover, Farm and College, pp. 293-294. 
9Taylor, "Birth of WARF," WARF Manuscripts and Records; Steenbock to George 
I. Haight, December 7, 1929, WARF Manuscripts and Records. Steenbock claimed in 
this letter to have originated the WARF idea. He also stated that the plan was an "out-
growth of a conference of Mr. Miner and myself. . .. " As Steenbock did not have the 
WARF scheme in mind before his meeting with Miner and since Miner surely knew of 
the Hoskins-Wiles proposal, it seems more likely that that plan was the key influence in 
shaping Steenbock's thinking. Steenbock did not, however, rely wholly on the Chicago 
proposal; local needs also shaped his thinking. 
lORussell, "The Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation: Its Purpose," February, 
1931, WARF Manuscripts and Records. The refusal of Wisconsin biochemist Stephen 
M. Babcock to patent his butterfat test was a case in point. Several manufacturers of 
dairy equipment, in their eagerness to undersell competition, had produced lines of 
cheaply constructed machines which were not only inaccurate but dangerous to use. As 
a result, Babcock's test fe11 into temporary disrepute. Only later, when state legislatures 
imposed controls did his discovery become really useful. 
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Yet even with Russell's support Steenbock met difficulty in giving form 
to the foundation plan. Financing proved a critical problem. Expenses of 
securing a patent quickly exhausted Steenbock's personal resources, and 
University regents proved unwilling to risk any money on the venture. So 
embittered was Steenbock by University disinterest, in fact, that late in 1924 
he began seriously to consider selling his idea to the Quaker Oats Company, 
which had offered him $900,000 for his rights in the discovery.11 
The timely aide of Graduate School dean Charles S. Slichter made that 
step unnecessary, however. An able fund-raiser and a man with strong 
alumni contacts Slichter, after learning of Steenbock's problem, paid visits 
to key people in Chicago and New York and returned not only with suf-
ficient funds to pay Steenbock's expenses but also with promises from prom-
inent alumni to serve as foundation trustees.12 
Matters then proceeded more rapidly. In August, 1925 the University 
regents, having been assured by Russell and Slichter that the proposed 
foundation entailed neither financial support nor responsibility from them, 
gave approval to the project. Finally, in November the endowment group 
received its charter of incorporation and assumed official existence as the 
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation.13 
That existence, while certified, was not yet secured, for immediately the 
Foundation encountered strong criticism of its structure, purposes, and 
leadership - both from inside and outside the University and from scien-
tists and non-scientists alike. 
The most influential critic, whose objections were fairly representative, 
was A. J. Glover, editor of a leading dairy journal. Glover insisted that Uni-
versity of Wisconsin scientists had no right to patent discoveries made on 
public time and financed by public funds. Handing over such patents to a 
private corporation compounded the injury done the public interest. Ru-
mors had it that WARF would negotiate exclusive licenses, which to Glover 
made matters even worse. If the Foundation, for example, signed a contract 
11Statement by University business manager James Phillips to Capital Times, March 
8, 1938. Phillips was explaining the regents' reluctance in 1924 to use University money 
to encourage the Foundation idea; Steenbock to Birge, December 9, 1924, WARF Man-
uscripts and Records; Russell notes, February 17, 1925, WARF Manuscripts and Rec-
ords; Steenbock to George Haight, December 7, 1929, WARF Manuscripts and Records. 
12Steenbock to George Haight, December 7, 1929, WARF Manuscripts and Rec-
ords; Taylor, "Birth of the WARF," WARF Manuscripts and Records. 
13Minutes of the Regents, May 8, 1925, May 18, 1925, and August, 1925, Secretary 
of the Regents Papers, boxes 38, 39; Madison Capital Times, November 14, 1928; Russell, 
"Decade of Service," May 25, 1926, WARF Manuscripts and Records. The Foundation 
received key legal aid from Madison attorney H. L. Butler. On Butler's role see Steen-
bock to Russell, December 10, 1929, and Russell, "Decade of Service," May 25, 1936, 
WARF Manuscripts and Records. Butler was technically excluded from serving as a 
trustee because he was not a University alumnus. He continued to give the Foundation 
his friendship and aid until his death in the 1930's. 
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with the Quaker Oats Company, an out-of-state firm which had contributed 
nothing to Steenbock's research, the arrangement would exclude the many 
tax-paying millers in Wisconsin.14 So strong were Glover's feelings that he 
warned the University that if it persisted with the Foundation plan, he and 
his journal would fight the College of Agriculture by attacking its ap-
propriation in the legislature.15 
By the end of 1925 the Foundation, a yet unproven venture, badly 
needed a defender. Pressure from Glover, particularly, was causing Univer-
sity president Glenn Frank and certain of the regents to waver in their sup-
port of WARF.16 H. L. Russell, head of the college where Steenbock's work 
was done, was the logical one to assume the advocate's role. 
His reply to Glover was blunt and to the point. There were two ways, 
he said, to handle a laboratory discovery as significant as Steenbock's. The 
wrong way was to give it to the public without restrictions: such misplaced 
idealism opened the door to mis-use and fraud. The right - and legal -
way was to seek a patent and then dispose of it in a manner which would 
allow the public really to benefit.17 As for Glover's charge that a corpora-
tion was incapable of working in the public interest, Russell suggested that 
the editor did not know what he was talking about. Corporate activity was 
not synonymous with exploitation. A corporation was merely a highly ef-
ficient legal instrument for transacting business. The Board of Regents was 
a corporation and "yet no one thinks of accusing them, because they are a 
private corporation, of misusing the trust ... placed in their hands.18 Be-
sides, WARF-unlike the typical business corporation - would not pay its 
shareholders any of the profits arising from patent development.19 
Glover was equally in error, Russell said, in criticizing exclusive licens-
ing. Since licensees would have to spend considerable sums developing 
patents for commercial use, exclusive rights were vital in attracting busi-
ness's interest. Moreover, preferential licensing did not abuse the rights of 
Wisconsin firms. Federal money had paid for most of Steenbock's research, 
so taxpaying corporations in Wisconsin had no special claims on the Foun-
dation.20 
14A. J. Glover to Russell, October 24, 1925, WARF Manuscripts and Records; also 
see Morrison to Russell, December 14, 1925, WARF Manuscripts and Records. 
15Jbid. The argument that controlled licensing would protect butter against the 
oleomargarine interests had no impact on Glover, who insisted that butter was a superior 
product and could take care of itself. See Steenbock to Russell, December 17, 1925, 
WARF Manuscripts and Records. 
16Morrison to Russell, December 14, 1925, WARF Manuscripts and Records; Russell 
to Morrison, January 22, 1926, ibid. 
17Russell to Glover, January 16, 1926, WARF Manuscripts and Records. 
lBJbid. 
19Jbid. 
20Russell to Morrison, January 22, 1926, WARF Manuscripts and Records. 
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In the end the regents and President Frank did not re-open the Founda-
tion question, and Glover never made good his threat. Whether or not 
Russell dissuaded him was not certain, but the fact that the farm editor 
ceased openly attacking the Foundation after Russell responded to his ob-
jections suggested that the dean's replies led him to reconsider his position. 
Once securing the position of the Foundation its leaders were able to 
turn to the task of policy definition. Setting proper boundaries between 
WARF and the University was a special concern, and it was agreed that no 
one connected with the University could serve in any capacity with the 
Foundation. 21 On the other hand there were certain relationships that the 
University must control. At the urging of Deans Russell and Slichter trus-
tees agreed that the University would have full responsibility for proposing 
research requests and for administering gifts. 22 
WARF did not, however, relinquish the right to help determine the 
ground rules for using its money. Steenbock, especially, was wary of giving 
WARF funds to departmental administrators, instead of to active investiga-
tors. Such a policy, he felt, would open the way to mis-use of funds for 
teaching and extension work. Moreover, uncontrolled allocation of gifts 
would very soon turn WARF into a "pensioning board whereby older mem-
bers of the faculty might be lulled into smug complacency, sudeited with 
equipment and assistants . . . ."23 WARF trustees agreed and decided to 
limit its grants to specific research projects. 
Business policy also got consideration, of course, during the early, form-
ative period. An initial decision was to withhold licenses from oleomarga-
rine manufacturers. For other firms trustees agreed that royalties should 
be as large as possible but small enough to permit licensees to irradiate their 
products without a price increase.24 In July, 1927 trustees negotiated the 
first contract, which gave the Quaker Oats Company exclusive rights to the 
Steenbock process in the manufacture of cereal foods. The firm was just 
2l[bid. 
22SJichter to Russell, April 18, 1929, Graduate School, Administration, Dean's Of-
fice, 16; also see Russell Memorandum, May, 1928, WARF Manuscripts and Records. 
23Steenbock Memorandum, June 13, 1928, WARF Manuscripts and Records. 
24W. S. Kies, "Science Goes to Market," Review of Reviews, LXXXIV, September, 
1931, 42-45; Minutes of WARF Trustees, May 8, 1926, Minute Book WARF Office. 
The Foundation succeeded in defending the irradiation patent until 1945 when the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, California, invalidated it. As the 
legal reversal came only months before patent expiration, trustees decided not to appeal 
the decision. See statement of George Haight, January 14, 1946, WARF Manuscripts 
and Records. 
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then trying to combat charges that rolled oats were a major cause of cavi-
ties in teeth. The hope was that irradiation would eliminate that problem. 2 5 
Recognizing a responsibility to make vitamin D widely available to in-
fants and children, Russell and Slichter early agreed that the Foundation 
should arrange the marketing of a cod-liver oil (the chief source of vitamin 
D then available) substitute without delay. 26 Fortunately, Steenbock's proc-
ess was readily adaptable to the manufacture of medicinals, and by 1929 
several major pharmaceutical firms were marketing a concentrated vitamin 
D oil called viosterol. The first irradiated product to reach the public, vi-
osterol had none of cod-liver oil's objectionable fishy taste and as a result 
enjoyed an enthusiastic response. 27 
On the whole, WARF followed a very conservative licensing policy. 
Excepting Quaker Oats, trustees refused to license food concerns in the 
early years due to a lack of sufficient experimental data on irradiation. 28 
The Foundation refused to deal at all with firms whose products had no real 
food value and which were only interested in having an advertising gim-
mick. Scores of companies, manufacturing such products as beer, lipstick, 
and chewing gum sent agents to Madison seeking contracts, but their efforts 
were futile. WARF lost revenue ( in the short run, at least) by refusing to 
license all comers, but the trustees and their University advisers felt that 
preservation of the Foundation's good name was worth the cost. 29 
Despite its caution the Foundation realized a substantial income rather 
quickly. By 1929, thanks mostly to royalties from pharmaceutical com-
panies, WARF was earning $1000 per day. Future prospects were even 
brighter: several foreign firms, an American yeast manufacturer, and one of 
the nation's largest bread companies were soon to s(gn agreements with the 
Foundation. 30 
Rising revenues inevitably meant an increase in management tasks, and 
trustees soon realized that unless they got help in managing Foundation af-
20E. B. Fred, "The Early Days of the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation," 
(privately circulated, March, 1960), _pp. 22-23; New York Sun, July 17, 1927. Quaker 
Oats was so eager to utilize the irradiation process ahead of competition that it signed 
with WARF a full year before Steenbock won final patent approval for his discovery. 
See U. S. Patent Office, Patent Number 1,680,818, August 14, 1928. Copy in WARF 
Manuscripts and Records. 
26Slichter to Russell, December 18, 1925, WARF Manuscripts and Records; also see 
Haight to Frank, May 28, 1928, WARF Manuscripts and Records. 
27Russell, "Scholars from Dollars," Wisconsin Alumnus, Centennial Edition, July, 
1938, pp. 333-40; Milwaukee Sentinel, March 15, 1933. 
28Russell, "Decade of Service," May 25, 1936, WARF Manuscripts and Records; 
Russell, Report to WARF Trustees, Report Book, WARF Office. 
29Russell in the Capital Times, March 15, 1933; Russell, "Decade of Service," May 
25, 1936, WARF Manuscripts and Records. 
aow. S. Kies, "Science Goes to Market," Review of Reviews, LXXXIV, September, 
1931, 42-45; "Report of the Committee on Clinical Investigation and Scientific Re-
search," Journal of Pediatrics, VIII, January, 1936, 124-30. 
38 THE SoUTH CAROLINA H1sTORICAL AssocIATION 
fairs, they would have to give up their own professional careers. So in 1929 
they began a search for a full-time executive officer.31 The man they settled 
upon was H. L. Russell. Russell not only had the requisite business experi-
ence and scientific ability, but he was also available. As a result of prob-
lems created by the 1920's agricultural depression, he was having a difficult 
time as dean just then and welcomed the opportunity to switch full-time to 
the Foundation. a2 
As executive director Russell's chief responsibility was the development 
of new business, and his success in licensing major producers of bottled and 
canned milk was particularly important in boosting Foundation income33 
Besides his business function Russell also served, informally, as a middleman 
between WARF and the University scientific community. By the time he 
assumed his duties the Foundation had amassed a sizeable endowment 
($400,000 by 1931) and was beginning to make large and regular grants to 
University research.34 Knowing first-hand the problems and needs of scien-
tists Russell helped convince trustees to award funds on a long-term basis, 
thereby assuring researchers of the continuing support that their projects 
required. Such policies won the Foundation strong friends from within the 
University. Several of the science faculty admitted to Russell that their 
main reason for declining higher paying offers from outside was WARF's 
far-sighted research policy.35 
Trustees did not pay heed to all of Russell's suggestions. In 1932 he 
urged them to consider widening the range of their gifts to include social as 
well as natural sciences. "The feeling is quite prevalent on the campus that 
the Research Foundation is not interested in other aspects of knowledge 
than the technical fields. In fact, one hears the accusation that the ideals 
of the Foundation foster so strongly the commercialization of university 
thought that the real spirit of the search for truth for truth's sake is likely 
31Russell, "Scholars from Dollars," Wisconsin Alumnus, July, 1938, p. 339. 
32Judge Timothy Brown, interview with the author, July 28, 1964. Russell's start-
ing salary was $10,000 per year, plus a small share of WARF's gross receipts. Total 
compensation was limited to $12,500. Russell's last salary at the College had been $7500 
per annum, plus house allowance, a total which was about equal to his Foundation 
salary. See Minutes of WARF trustees, June 21, 1930. 
33Minutes of WARF Trustees, June 21, 1930, Minute Book; also see Hanks to 
Russell, September 24, 1929, Russell Papers, box 2, University of Wisconsin Archives; 
A. J. Horlick to Russell, November 22, 1929, Russell Papers, box 2; Russell, "Decade of 
Service," May 25, 1936, WARF Manuscripts and Records; Russell, Director's Report, 
April 16, 1938, WARF Manuscripts and Records. 
34Capital Times, July 2, 1931; By 1931 Steenbock's patent had earned the Founda-
tion $400,000. Although WARF owned several other patents by the 1930's, only one 
other was put on an income-producing basis. That patent was the one donated by bio-
chemist E. B. Tart, on his discovery of a treatment for secondary anemia. 
35Russell, "Decade of Service, May 25, 1936, WARF Manuscripts and Records. 
DOLLARS FROM SCHOLARS: WISCONSIN ALUMNI RESEARCH FOUNDATION 39 
to be subordinated to the development of commercial ends."36 With the 
1930's depression then forcing drastic budget reductions at the University, 
such support would have been timely. But the trustees were unwilling to 
expand the scope of gifts, feeling that the Foundation must build up its en-
dowment before supporting fields which lacked income-producing poten-
tiaJ. 37 
Russell was more successful in convincing trustees to meet the special 
needs of the natural scientists during the depression. In 1933, in fact, he 
and Slichter were instrumental in getting WARF to make an extraordinary 
and perhaps crucial grant to University research. The previous year a 
severe reduction in state appropriations had forced cut-backs all along the 
line at the University. Every faculty member had taken a sizeable salary 
cut and many of the junior staff had had their contracts terminated. 38 Re-
search at the University was put under an especial handicap: the legisla-
ture halved the 1932-1933 budget, thereby choking off funds to many proj-
ects. In the natural sciences, specifically in physiology and biochemistry, 
the collapse of anticipated grants from the General Education Board and 
the Brittingham endowment further disorganized plans. 39 In 1932 Russell 
and others urged WARF to make up the science deficiencies, by dipping in-
to capital reserves, but trustees refused on the ground that such a gift would 
tempt the legislature to shift the whole research burden to WARF. Even 
the faculty might succumb to such short-sightedness, they feared. As trus-
tee Evan Evans said, an emergency gift would tempt scholars to say, "To-
- with the future. We want ours now."40 
By early 1933, however, the crisis had intensified. Despite economy 
measures the University was still operating in the red, and the release and 
resignation of many senior faculty appeared inevitable. At that crucial junc-
ture Dean Slichter came before the April trustees' meeting, explained the 
bleak picture, and implored them in strongest terms to help prevent the dis-
integration of University science. 
Russell then took the floor and told the Foundation leaders quite 
frankly that if they let Wisconsin's key scientific men drift away, WARF 
would have absolutely no reason to continue. What, he asked, was the chief 
36Russell, Director's Report to Trustees, March 26, 1932, Report Book. 
37£. B. Fred, interview with the author. 
38Russell, "Decade of Service," May 25, 1936, WARF Manuscripts and Records. 
39Russell, Report to WARF Trustees, March 26, 1932, and April 3, 1931, Report 
Book. 
40Evan Evans to Slichter, May 22, 1934, Graduate School, Dean's Office, Slichter's 
General Files, box 16. Russell, Report to WARF Trustees, March 26, 1932, Report 
Book. Slichter to Kies, June 15, 1932, WARF Manuscripts and Records. Russell, "De-
cade of Service," May 25, 1936, WARF Manuscripts and Records. 
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purpose of the Foundation? Its aim, of course, was to aid the development 
of scientific research at Wisconsin. But if top investigators left, there would 
be little science to support. Even though a large grant might tempt legisla-
tors to discontinue state aid to research, Russell felt the emergency de-
manded taking that risk. "Can we do less," he asked, "than to step into this 
breech at the present time?"41 The next month trustees approved the emer-
gency grant. 
In the period from 1933-1935 WARF gave the University $317,000 for 
support of research in the natural sciences. For WARF the gift was extra-
ordinary: in no previous two-year period had grants totalled more than $45,-
000. The University used most of the money to provide a paid research 
leave to sixty-one members of the scientific staff. Indirectly, the gift aided 
a far larger number of scholars, for it freed sizeable University funds for use 
elsewhere in the institution.42 
At the end of 1934 a survey of American research institutions placed 
the University of Wisconsin in the front rank of the country's universities. 
On the basis of the number of departments providing top quality graduate 
training Wisconsin tied the University of California for first place. Such 
high standing in research underscored the significance of the WARF grant. 
Had the Foundation not taken up the burden of research support, the Uni-
versity could not have maintained its high position in American higher edu-
cation. 43 
Despite its generosity the Foundation had its antagonists. Madison 
editor William T. Evjue, the longtime spokesman of LaFollette progressiv-
ism, was one. A persistent critic of the University for its acceptance of cor-
poration gifts, Evjue was convinced that WARF was in league with eastern 
big business to exploit the public. The fact that WARF withheld royalties 
from the University and used the money to purchase corporate securities 
was evidence of an alliance. 44 But cheating the University was only one of 
WARF's sins: "The new foundation," he told readers in 1931, "will put the 
tag of the dollar sign on research at the University and research will be con-
ducted on a corporation basis with dividends as the dominating motive."45 
Given WARF's leadership, such policies were not surprising. Nearly all trus-
tees, he charged, were "men on the reactionary side of the fence who are 
... identified with corporate wealth."4 6 
41Russell, Report to WARF Trustees, April 21, 1933, Report Book; Russell, "De-
cade of Service," May 25, 1936, WARF Manuscripts and Records; Minutes of WARF 
Trustees, April 21, 1933, Minute Book. 
42Russell, "Decade of Service, May 25, 1936, WARF Manuscripts and Records. 
43W. S. Kies, "Concerning the Research Foundation," Wisconsin Alumni Magazine, 
XXXVI, March, 1935, 167-71, 192. 
44Capital Times, April 26, 1931, June 11, 1937. 
45/bid., May 21, 1931. 
46/bid., April 28, 1938. 
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Not until the public exerted a measure of control over the Foundation, 
he argued, would it respect the interests of the University and the people. 
Since Wisconsin citizens had paid for the research discoveries WARF ex-
ploited, they had at least the right to a regular accounting from the organi-
zation. But the "high and mighty" Foundation, cloaking its dealings in se-
crecy, refused to answer to anyone. 47 Unless Wisconsin regents brought 
that "Sacred Cow" under control, Evjue warned, WARF with its rapidly in-
creasing endowment would soon displace the people as the controlling force 
over the University.48 
By and large Russell reponded to Evjue's attacks by ignoring them. His 
strategy of silence probably helped prevent local criticism from generating 
serious challenges to the Foundation, for only once did Evjue succeed in 
enlisting significant support for his position. In 1938 newly appointed re-
gent, Weber Kelly, who sympathized with Evjue's position, convinced the 
Board to undertake an investigation of WARF, with the aim of subjecting 
it to, public control. Kelly got strong backing from fellow regent A. J. Glover, 
who apparently still harbored doubts about WARF. 
The investigation won little backing from the University community. 
Most of the faculty and new president Clarence Dykstra preferred to leave 
arrangements as they were. Some parties were openly hostile to the regent 
move. The Milwaukee Journal accused the regents of cheap politics. Steen-
bock's reaction was even sharper. Encountering Regent Kelly once at lunch 
he ripped him up for involving WARF in a political fight and told him that 
if he could trust the Foundation to handle his million dollar patent, surely 
the regents could exhibit a little faith on their part.49 Ultimately the Board 
passed a watered-down resolution merely requesting the Foundation to alter 
its procedures. Thanks to Dykstra's willingness to stall further investigations 
the reforms were eventually forgotten. 60 
By 1940 the pioneering phase of WARF's history had come to an end, 
for by that time all the major sources of royalty income from the Steenbock 
patent had been tapped. But far from marking a decline in the Foundation's 
prospects 1940 found WARF firmly established as a science endowment 
47Jbid., April 28, 1938; also see ibid., May 8, 1934, October 11, 1934. 
48Jbid., May 21, 1931; also see ibid., June 11, 1937, July 13, 1937. 
49Jbid., July 2, 1932, April 24, 1931; Noble Clark, interview with the author, July 
2, 1964. Dave Barney to Russell, May 3, 1938, WARF Manuscripts and Records; also see 
Capital Times, March 8, 1938; Kelly to Russell, April 18, 1938, WARF Manuscripts and 
Records; Milwaukee Journal, March 13, 1938. 
50Kelly to Russell, April 18, 1938, WARF Manuscripts and Records; Papers of the 
Board of Regents, April 26-April 27, 1938, University of Wisconsin Archives. On Dyk-
stra's strategy see Dave Barney to Russell, May 5, 1938, WARF Manuscripts and Rec-
ords. WARF did not issue a financial report until 1948, and then it did so voluntarily. 
See Capital Times, June 6, 1948. No changes were made in the makeup of its board. 
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agency, whose annual research gifts were then approaching the $200,000 
mark. 61 Apart from the Steen bock patent itself, the key factor in explaining 
the Foundation's success was the skill of trustees in the work of money man-
agement. 
By bold investment trustees were able, within little over a decade and 
during a severe national economic depression, to convert royalty earnings 
into a multi-million dollar research endowment. Trustee Thomas Britting-
ham commented on WARF's investment strategy: "Just as no racing enthu-
siast would buy an old stud horse to complete with [promising] younger 
horses ... , no wise investor would put his money in one of the old-line com-
panies which has passed its peak and is resting on its laurels ... " For the 
Foundation "maximum results have been obtained through [the stocks of] 
growing companies, keeping them until they have completed their growth 
and discarding them when public fancy has changed them into blue chips 
"52 
By 1940 Wisconsin's "experiment in socializing profits" had many imita-
tors at other American universities.53 None, however, had succeeded as well 
as WARF in permitting science to become independent of traditional, and 
often short-sighted, benefactors. 54 In 1947 Foundation assets were valued at 
$12,474,945. A decade later the WARF portfolio was worth about $40,000,-
000. Between 1926 and 1956 the Foundation gave over $13,000,000 to sup-
port University research. Nearly all those grants came from interest earn-
ings. Through WARF Wisconsin science had found a means of paying a 
large share of its own way, in dollars which had come initially from Univer-
sity scholars. 55 
61Russell, "Scholars from Dollars," The Wisconsin Alumnus, Centennial Edition, 
July, 1938, p. 339. The first WARF grant was a $500 gift, made in 1928. In 1938-39 it 
gave over $185,000 to the University. On Russell's resignation, which was in accord 
with WARF's retirement policy, see Russell letter to the Foundation, June 5, 1939, 
Russell biographical material, WARF Office. 
52Thomas Brittingham, "Bold Investments Pay Off," Wisconsin Alumni Magazine, 
LIX, October, 1957, 23-26; also see Russell Biographical Material, WARF Office; 
Russell, "Scholars from Dollars," Wisconsin Alumnus, July, 1938, p. 339. 
53Russell, "A Decade of Service," May 25, 1936, WARF Manuscripts and Records. 
540ne survey of university foundations ranked WARF and Toronto University's 
foundation as the two most successful such ventures; see "Research: Self-Supporting," 
Medical Ethics, December, 1935. For a detailed survey of university foundations, see 
Archie Mcinnes Palmer, "University Patent Policies," Journal af the Patent Office So-
ciety, February, 1934. 
55Thomas Brittingham, "Bold Investments Pay Off," W isconsin Alumni Magazine, 
LIX, October, 1957, 23-26; also see Russell Biographical Material, WARF Office; 
Russell, "Scholars from Dollars," Wisconsin Alumnus, July, 1938, p . 339. Capital Times, 
June 6, 1948. 
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